"At age 27, she gets furious": scripts on marriage and life course variation in The Netherlands, 1850-1970 by Kok, Jan
www.ssoar.info
"At age 27, she gets furious": scripts on marriage
and life course variation in The Netherlands,
1850-1970
Kok, Jan
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kok, J. (2014). "At age 27, she gets furious": scripts on marriage and life course variation in The Netherlands,
1850-1970. Historical Social Research, 39(1), 113-132. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.39.2014.1.113-132
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-383880
Historical Social Research 39 (2014) 1, 113-132 │© GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.39.2014.1.113-132 
“At age 27, she gets furious”. Scripts on Marriage and 
Life Course Variation in The Netherlands, 1850-1970 
Jan Kok ∗ 
Abstract: »”Mit 27 Jahren wird sie unruhig“: Skripte über Ehe und Lebensver-
lauf-Variation in den Niederlanden, 1850-1970«. Marrying too old, too young, 
or not at all could elicit scorn from all sides: family, friends and neighbours. The 
same could occur when a partner was much younger or older. During moderni-
zation new societal norms on marriage are supposed to have emerged and to 
have become more pervasive, as individual access to and timing of marriage 
became less dependent on family fortunes and family strategies. In this article, 
life courses of more than 15,000 Dutch individuals are studied in order to an-
swer the question: was their timing of marriage and choice of partner related 
to (changing) life scripts – and what social or cultural groups were the carriers 
of these scripts – or still predominantly determined by family dynamics? 
Keywords: Celibacy, late marriage, early marriage, age homogamy, life scripts. 
1.  Introduction 
Following the seminal work of Dixon (1971), variation in timing and incidence 
of marriage has generally been studied by looking at three factors: feasibility of 
marriage, desirability of marriage, and availability of partners. Feasibility indi-
cates the possibility for a couple to form a new family, which depends on earning 
capacity on the one hand, and residential customs and expected living standards 
on the other. Feasibility, and thus age at marriage, is affected by economic cycles 
and squeezes on the housing market. Social classes may differ strongly in what is 
considered a proper economic foundation for a family. Furthermore, income 
profiles differ by age and class. For instance, whereas elite men needed to com-
plete higher education and acquire a good position to properly ground their 
marriage, many manual workers reached their peak earnings at an early age and 
saw no reason to postpone marriage. Similarly, the desirability of marriage can 
change over time and differ by gender and across subgroups. The more attrac-
tive alternatives to marriage exist, the less desirable marriage becomes. In 
particular, scholars have pointed at the increase of female education and female 
employment to explain the decrease in early marriage of women. The desirabil-
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ity of marriage and family life tends to increase after major societal upheavals, 
such as war (Hacker 2008). Finally, the availability of partners depends, of 
course, on the demographic characteristics of the marriage market, which can 
be skewed by gender-specific mortality or migration, but perhaps even more on 
the preferences for the ‘right’ partner, who may have to be selected from a 
restricted racial, ethnic, religious or social subgroup, in combination with a 
preferred age. 
Dixon’s framework is an elegant combination of cultural, economic and 
demographic factors, but these components are difficult to separate. Is it possi-
ble to study the more or less autonomous impact on marriage of ‘life scripts’, in 
particular age norms on the proper timing of life course transitions (see 
Boonstra, Bras and Derks 2014 in this HSR Focus). Is it possible to find out 
whether people were adhering to norms when marrying at a given age, and can 
we distinguish that from their personal economic situation and their personal 
likelihood of finding a partner? How to conceptualize such norms? In her dis-
cussion of age norms Marini (1984) describes their distinguishing features: “it 
involves a collective, or shared, evaluation of what behavior ought to be […] it 
involves the application of sanctions to induce a particular behaviour” 
(232).We need to ask ourselves the following questions. First, what was the 
actual content of norms on marriage? Second, what does ‘collective’ stand for: 
specific social groups, local communities or the entire nation? Finally, to what 
extent did sanctions exist and when could they function effectively – if at all? 
Research in this field is guided by the notion of a cultural shift in the appre-
ciation of marriage and family life during the ‘long’ nineteenth century. In-
spired by Enlightenment notions, the emerging bourgeoisie put great value on 
the family as the major locus of moral improvement of society, and as the place 
where the new roles that industrializing society demanded of men, women and 
children were to be learned and enacted. The lower classes followed suit and 
began to marry younger and more often as, according to Matthijs (2002, 2003), 
their ‘mimetic appetite’ for marriage increased. Not only did marriage become 
more popular, the quality of marital relations changed according to several 
scholars. The role of instrumental motives for marrying and in the selection of 
a partner (e.g. the running of a family business) began to decrease and to be 
replaced by a greater emphasis on love and personal compatibility (e.g. Shorter 
1975; Gillis 1985). According to some, this shift towards individual choices 
resulted from economic modernization, as on the one hand the number of eco-
nomic niches expanded and on the other hand the grip of family and local 
community on those niches weakened. But so far, no strong links have been 
found between industrialization and urbanization and changes in marriage 
patterns, suggesting that a more or less autonomous cultural change might have 
been going on (Van de Putte et al. 2009). 
The nineteenth and early twentieth century supposedly saw a shift from ‘in-
strumental’ marriage choices to choices based on romantic love, which became 
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a new norm. It can be said that in the older pattern marriage was geared to the 
logic of the family economy and demographic hazards (e.g. size of the family, 
death of one of the parents), whereas in the new pattern individual characteris-
tics (education, income prospects et cetera) became paramount. In the older 
pattern, the limited availability of economic niches implied that a sizeable 
number of people could not marry, or had to wait a long time before acquiring 
the proper means to marry. This does not mean that the community looked 
approvingly at celibate or late-marrying. On the contrary, celibates were never 
considered ‘true’ adults. And marriage should take place with a (broad) age 
range. The choice of partners was – to some extent– also ’ instrumental’ mean-
ing that age or civil status could be less important than work skills, dowry or 
property brought to the marriage. But, again, strong differences in age between 
spouses were disapproved of by the community. The shift towards ‘modern’, 
romantic marriage implied that the traditional reasons for delaying or foregoing 
marriage became less important for individuals. Concomitant with this shift is 
greater equality of marriage partners, in terms of ages.  
In this article, I will use reconstructed life courses from the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries to answer the question to what extent marriage frequency 
and timing merely reflects individual desirability and feasibility to marry and to 
what extent we can discern social or cultural group norms. This relates to op-
tions B and C in Table 2 in Boonstra, Bras and Derks, this HSR Focus. I will 
focus on life course ‘deviations’ from a) the norm prescribing marriage as the 
natural fulfillment of adult lives; b) the norm that marriage should not take 
place before or beyond a given age range and c) the norm that age differences 
between spouses should be limited. In doing so, I hope to assess the potential 
weight of (subgroups) scripts in relation to family factors influencing marriage 
timing. Moreover, I will test whether a supposed change in life scripts translate 
into earlier, more frequent and more age homogamous marriages in the course 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In doing so, I hope to con-
tribute to the ongoing discussion on the nature of changes in marriage patterns 
during modernization. In the next section, I will discuss expressions of mar-
riage norms in Dutch 19th and early 20th century society. Then, I will briefly 
introduce the data and methods employed in this study. In a further section, I 
will look at individual backgrounds and the potential role of collective life 
scripts in marrying ‘early’, ‘late’ or not at all, and then I will discuss whether 
these backgrounds and scripts are also related to marrying a much older of 
younger spouse. 
2.  Scripts on Marriage 
Societal pressure on marriage came in many ways. In 1838, one of the leading 
newspapers in The Netherlands published a ‘Lover’s Thermometer’, a ‘comic’ 
HSR 39 (2014) 1  │  116 
life course scenario of the life of spinsters and bachelors. It is too long to re-
produce here, but some examples may suffice. At each age, an impression of 
feelings toward marriage and others is given. For the spinsters, the Thermome-
ter starts at age 15, “when she desires to make her entry into the world at large 
and to attract the attention of men”. At age 23, “she flirts with every man she 
meets”. At age 27, “she gets furious, and cannot stand it when other girls of her 
age make a good match”. At age 29, “she despairs of ever getting married and 
takes her resort to all kinds of intrigues to attain marital status”. The Thermo-
meter then goes on to describe how her character turns for the worse by not 
being married: she shifts her interest to adornment (age 31); she gets jealous 
when other women are praised (35), she quibbles with her married friend (36), 
she enjoys discussing marital problems of her friends with others (38), she be-
comes evil (39), malignant (43) and sanctimonious (45). At age 49, “she takes a 
destitute relative in her house who has to care for her”. Finally, at age 50, “her 
aversion to the world gets the upper hand and she pours all her wickedness on her 
unhappy caretaker”. For the bachelor, the scenario is a bit different. He starts later 
and is initially more hesitant, and the Thermometer does allow him a relation (at 
age 24), but it ends due to his arrogance. At age 30, “he is sullen and grumpy 
when the discussion turns to marriage”. He is not giving up, however, and feels 
he can still get “a young dove” (age 34), he falls in love with a girl of seventeen 
(age 35), but is rejected (at age 36). His later life course is characterized by in-
creasing health problems and fear of solitude. At age 49, he takes in a housekeep-
er, and when – at last – he decides to marry her (age 59), he dies (Nieuwe Am-
sterdamsche Courant en Algemeen Handelsblad, 9 October 1838).  
This Thermometer stands in a long tradition of derision on the lives of spin-
sters and bachelors, which has been documented in various studies (Froide 
2005; Vicinus 1985; Chambers-Schiller 1984; Israel 2002, de Haan and Stam 
1985; Dorsman and Stavenuiter 1993). Although the general norm to marry 
was clear, a sizeable number of men and women remained celibate. The litera-
ture has suggested several economic, familial and religious factors to explain 
why in some groups celibacy persisted or even increased in a period when the 
‘appetite for marriage’ became stronger. Firstly, in some groups marriage delay 
and (eventual) celibacy was associated with increased standards of living, which 
kept people from forming a family (also Van Poppel, 1992, 103ff; Kohlbrugge 
1928). This ‘increased relative costs of marriage’ scenario applied especially to 
people from the middle and upper classes. Secondly, increased celibacy of 
women from the higher classes has been associated with the expansion of edu-
cation and career opportunities, which were not compatible with married life. 
Contemporaries complained that women from the upper class were wary of 
giving up their independent life style and were unwilling to take up the role of 
housewife. Kohlbrugge (1928, 4) wrote: “The woman [in intellectual circles, 
JK] has become so individualistic, that she misses the adaptability necessary 
for marriage” (also Adams 1996). On the other side of the social spectrum 
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stood living-in farmhands, for whom remaining celibate compared favourable 
to the situation of married laborers. In farming families, the designated succes-
sor was often a son. As a number of them did not manage to find (or afford) a 
wife, we can expect that farmer’s sons were relatively likely to remain single. 
In urban families, we often find that the youngest daughter stayed at home to 
‘bring the parents to the end’, that is care for them until they died. Although 
she received the parental home, this daughter often married late or not at all 
(Bras and Kok 2003). Finally, a possibility is that the choice to remain unmar-
ried was inspired by religious motives. Among Roman Catholics celibacy was 
evaluated much more positive than among Protestants, even for celibates who 
did not take up a career as nun or priest but became nurse or gardener in a 
cloister. In contrast, a (neo-Calvinist) Protestant theologian judged “celibacy in 
order to preserve one’s independence crude selfishness and morally objection-
able” (cited in Van Solinge and Van Poppel 1995, 157).  
Apart from minimal ages (18 for boys and 16 for girls) and the requirement 
of parental consent (up until age 30) in the Netherlands, legal restriction on 
marriage were limited. But there existed an extended normative discourse on 
the proper age to marry. The contemporary advice literature suggested 25 years 
as the ideal age and warned against too early and too late marriages (Van Pop-
pel 1992). This literature catered for the burgeoning upper-middle classes. For 
the farming and lower classes, especially in the countryside, unwritten customs 
were more important. Many indications (ranging from sayings to contemporary 
surveys) indicate a clear spectrum of proper and improper behaviour with re-
spect to marriage. For men, a critical threshold seems to have been age thirty. 
In several regions charivari marked their transition to permanent celibacy, e.g. 
by presenting them a symbolic key to the ‘oxen’s meadow’ (Van Poppel 1992). 
Similarly, many sayings and abusive terms indicated the hopelessness of un-
married women between 25 and 30. Often, 28 was named as the critical age for 
girls. There are less indications of popular resentment of too early marriages. 
People could started courting between age 16 and 18. However, too early mar-
riages among the working class were a great concern for the higher echelons of 
society, especially those responsible for social policy. Despite all their warn-
ings against the problems ensuing from ‘untimely marriages’, the marriages of 
the poor were not curbed. One of the arguments against restriction was that this 
would lead to an increase in illegitimate births – as most of the early marrying 
women were already pregnant (Van Poppel 1992). Similarly, norms against 
large age differences between spouses can be found in advice literature, prov-
erbs and sanctions in the form of charivari. Endogamy in terms of social stand-
ing and religion was the ideal, and the same hold true for age. People of differ-
ent ages simply did not match: ‘Young with old, is hot with cold’ (Van Poppel, 
1992, 47). Especially, marriages in which the wives were much older than their 
husbands were scorned. Youth groups would present couples with large age 
gaps with straw dummies, signifying barrenness. 
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Supposedly, the nineteenth and early twentieth century witnessed a gradual 
shift away from ‘instrumental marriage’ for which a proper economic founda-
tion was dominant over other considerations. Furthermore, marriage became 
more popular as it opened the door to the idealized family life and to individual 
fulfilment through romantic love. In short, marriage became more feasible and 
desirable, at least in some social groups. Romantic marriages require more 
communication and emotional encounters between partners, which presuppose 
shared experiences and outlooks, which, in turn, is more likely among age 
peers. Therefore, the supposed shift toward less instrumental marriage is also 
expected to result in larger age homogamy. Can we trace the groups and social 
settings where this normative shift occurred and where, in other words, new life 
scripts emerged? The research in this area hypothesizes ‘laggards’ and ‘fore-
runners’. For the elite and for farmers, marriage still rested on economic con-
siderations and strategies of partner selection were geared to finding the right 
partner who could add to the family fund (Kok, Mandemakers and Damsma 
2010). Other supposed ‘laggards’ are Roman Catholics. In the Catholic percep-
tion of marriage, (romantic) love plays a secondary role to procreation and 
patriarchal dominance of the husband over the wife was valued. Also, celibacy 
was evaluated more positively than among Protestants. Moreover, the role of 
familial concerns (e.g. the influence of the parents on their children’s marriage) 
it supposed to be stronger than among (Calvinist) protestants (Van de Putte et 
al. 2009). In terms of marriage motivations, the middle classes are ‘associated 
with respect for the formal family scripts’ (Van de Putte et al. 2009, 1238) 
implying a sound economic foundation for marriage, but are also supposed to 
take an interest in romantic love. The lower classes are seen as more unambig-
uous forerunners in the move toward romantic, egalitarian marriage. In this 
move, urban dwellers are believed to have taken the lead, as (big) cities were 
‘the core area of cultural change’ (Van de Putte et al. 2009, 1239). Traditional 
social control mechanism did not function here and ‘the concentration of peo-
ple, ideas, and information broadened one’s horizon and expectations’ (Van de 
Putte et al. 2009, 1239). Summing up, an emerging life script that makes mar-
riage – ideally with a same-age partner – a popular and individualized option is 
expected to lead to a decline in celibacy and late marriage, and possibly to a 
shift to early marriage as well. Moreover, we expect a decrease of older wife 
and older husband marriages in favour of same-age marriages. We expect these 
changes to occur among city dwellers, non-Catholics, and wage workers. To 
find out whether these groups indeed adhered to ‘new’ scripts, we need to 
control for other factors that may explain why individuals married late or not at 
all, or why they had to contend themselves with an older or younger partner. In 
the next section, I will explain how this can be done. 
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3.  Data and Methods 
This study is based on a large database, the Historical Sample of the Nether-
lands (HSN). The project compiles life course data as completely as possible for 
a representative portion of the 19th and 20th century population (Mandemakers 
2006). For this paper, I make use of the Data Set Life Courses Release 2010.01. 
This dataset covers the currently available data of the HSN in three parts: a) the 
provinces Utrecht, Friesland Zeeland and the city of Rotterdam for the birth 
period 1850-1882 (N=5.827), b) the other parts of the Netherlands for the birth 
period 1863-1882 (N=7.767) and c) the entire country for the birth period 
1883-1922 (N=23.579). As we focus on persons who have reached age fifty, 
the end of our period is roughly 1970. To study shifts and variations in the 
propensity to marry late, early or not at all, I refine the model proposed earlier 
by Engelen and Kok (2003). In their article, they used life course data from the 
birth cohort 1890-1909. We can now use a much larger sample as well as add 
more data on the household situation at an age when most young people had 
not yet started a serious search for marriage partners. I use a ‘snapshot’ of 
relevant characteristics (socio-economic status, religion, place of residence) 
and household composition at age eighteen and use this as a ‘predictor’ of the 
later ‘marital career’. I am interested in four outcomes: (relative) early mar-
riage, ‘normal’ marriage, late marriage and celibacy. I employ a technique 
called multinomial (or polytomous) logistic regression which is a suitable 
method for modelling discrete choices. This technique is a variant of binary (or 
dichotomous) logistic regression, which was developed to analyse dependent 
variables with only two outcomes (yes or no). In that situation, a non-linear 
model is more appropriate than a linear regression. The probability (p) of the 
dependent variable being a yes or no is calculated in terms of odds, that is the 
probability of a “yes” divided by the probability of a “no” (p/(1-p)). The re-
gression coefficients of the independent variables are the natural logarithms of 
the odds. By exponentiation, we obtain odds ratios. These indicate the increase 
in the odds of the dependent variable of being a yes resulting from an increase 
of one unit in the independent variable (Menard 1995). In the multinomial 
variant, the probabilities are calculated in relation to a baseline or reference 
category. In my model, the reference group is defined as “marrying at a normal 
age” (23-30 for men and 21-28 for women).  
In categorizing religious denominations I follow a distinction between Lib-
eral and Orthodox protestant groups discussed in more detail elsewhere (Kok 
and Van Bavel 2006), but I create a separate category for the highly liberal, 
rather elite groups of Remonstrants and Mennonites. In our earlier research on the 
cohort 1890-1909, Remonstrants and Mennonites stood out with very high per-
centages never married, for men and women alike (Engelen and Kok 2003). In 
the final decades of the nineteenth century, the Remonstrant Church experienced a 
period of strong growth, due to an influx of liberal Protestants who were escaping 
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a revival of orthodoxy in their own churches (Knippenberg 1992). Typically, 
the Remonstrants were urban, wealthy and freethinking. The Mennonites 
shared a tendency towards free thought with the Remonstrants, but were more 
strongly rural-based, particularly in the north-western Netherlands. Their decline 
during the twentieth century has been ascribed to very low marital fertility (and 
high levels of apostasy) (Knippenberg 1992, 134) but, apparently, high celibacy 
also contributed. The categorization of social groups in based on the stratification 
scheme HISCLASS (Van Leeuwen and Maas 2011) which builds on the interna-
tional coding scheme HISCO (Van Leeuwen, Maas and Miles 2002). To find out 
whether urban places are indeed in the forefront of innovative marital behaviour, 
we distinguish on the basis of population size (census). 
To find an ‘autonomous’ role for group norms, one needs to control for oth-
er factors influencing age and incidence of marriage. Clearly, it is near impos-
sible to locate and reconstruct all factors that influence marital choices over the 
life course. One would have to possess information on, on the hand, individual 
education, income (prospects), family situation, personal health and beauty, 
and on the other hand the state of the local marriage market, taking account of 
expected preferences for a partner with the same religion, ethnic and social 
background, and age. Moreover, one would have to take conjunctural changes 
into account, which may shift the age at marriage up or downwards. Most of 
this information is not available in the Historical Sample of the Netherlands. 
The censuses do not give information on the local marriage market (number of 
unmarried men and women by age) apart from a number of cities. Thus, we 
will have to limit ourselves to two ‘individual factors’: the family situation at 
age 18 and personal migration experience. Young people who have already lost 
one or both parents are less likely to follow the ‘instrumental-marriage’ scenar-
io in which the parents have a strong say in whether and when to marry. Thus, 
celibacy and late marriage may be less likely. The possibly difficult situation of 
a broken family may induce young people to marry as quickly as possible, and 
this means they may not be fastidious in their choice of partner, in other words, 
they may tend to have less often a same-age partners than others. Another 
aspect of the family situation is the number of younger brothers and sisters. A 
large number of younger siblings may increase the pressure on a person to 
make room and marry early, and it will be less likely that a person will have to 
take care if his/her ageing parents. Migrants will have to adjust to their new 
surroundings, which often resulted in a more protracted process of partner 
choice and marriage (Moreels and Matthijs 2011; Kok 2006). In this model, I 
only look at the difference between place at residence and birth place, and 
distinguish between rural and urban migrants. Before, presenting the models, I 
describe and discuss some general trends that emerge from the data. 
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4.  General Trends 
Figure 1: Ages at First Marriage and Percentages of Permanent Celibacy, by 
Birth Cohort 
 
 
Source: Historical sample of the Netherlands. Data Set Life Courses Release 2010.01. 
 
When we arrange the data by birth period, the first observation is that the 
changes in marriage patterns described for, among others, Flemish cities (e.g. 
Van de Putte 2009) are conspicuously absent for the Netherlands as a whole 
(Figure 1). We do find a decrease in celibacy, in particular for men. Their celi-
bacy ratio drops below ten percent already in the cohorts born after 1885. For 
women, the high levels of the cohort 1860-1869 are not replicated in younger 
cohorts, but the decline is less marked. Age at marriage for both sexes is sur-
prisingly constant. These findings more or less match the outcomes of Van 
Poppel (1992). He saw a decline in celibacy for men after (birth cohort) 1865, 
and for women after 1900 (22). Ages at first marriage were quite stable for 
mid- and late-nineteenth century cohorts and for both men and women dropped 
after the birth cohort 1905-1909 (Van Poppel 1992, 22). A limited variation 
around the mean can be seen as an indication of conformity (Van Poppel and 
Nelissen 1999). A decrease in the variation coefficient can be expected when 
more people marry at the ‘appropriate’ (or average) age. Interestingly, for 
women such a trend is not visible, but men born after 1885 do seem to marry 
more often at the average age than men born earlier (Figure 2). Finally, there 
seems to be a slight increase in same-age marriages for women born after 1870, 
but this is not sustained among early twentieth-century cohorts. For men, again, 
this trend seems stronger and more persistent (Figure 3). 
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Figure 2: Variation Coefficient of the Age at First Marriage, by Birth Cohort 
 
 
Source: Historical sample of the Netherlands. Data Set Life Courses Release 2010.01. 
Figure 3: Percentage Same-Age Marriages, by Birth Cohort 
 
 
Same-age marriages defined as first marriages of research persons with no more than three 
year difference in age with their partner. Source: Historical sample of the Netherlands. Data 
Set Life Courses Release 2010.01. 
 
Of course, the aggregated data shown in the figures may hide strong differ-
ences by social group, type of residence or religion. The multivariate analysis 
should reveal such differences. 
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5.  Deviations from the Norm 
What people – from what socio-economic or cultural group – ‘deviated’ from 
the broadly accepted norms that marriage should take place in one’s twenties? 
And what kind of people did not marry at all, to what extent do we find an 
overlap of permanent celibacy (and possibly causal relation) with delayed 
marriage? The results of the multinomial logistic regression are presented in 
the tables 1 (women) and 2 (men). We can clearly see that religion – control-
ling for other factors – had a decisive influence on the timing of marriage and 
on celibacy. Roman Catholic women had 58% higher odds of remaining celi-
bate, 44% higher odds of marrying late, and 18% lower odds of an early mar-
riage compared to the liberal protestants. A similar pattern of late marriage and 
celibacy is found among Catholic men. Rejecting modern forms of family 
planning, Catholics relied on the traditional option of late marriage as a way to 
keep the number of children within bounds. In this group, celibacy may have 
been the end result of a too extended waiting period. As in our previous study, 
Mennonite and Remonstrant women again stood out with high odds of celiba-
cy, and low chances of an early marriage (but not higher chances of late mar-
riage). In our earlier article, we suggested that women reared in this elite envi-
ronment received an education and acquired a life-style that did not fit easily 
with the expected roles of married women. Also, both denominations accorded 
unmarried women special, respected functions in parish work. For instance, the 
Mennonites had female deacons in charge of poor relief. Also, these churches 
were the first to allow women to become priests (in 1905), on the condition that 
they were not married (Engelen and Kok 2003). If not actually a cause of celi-
bacy, these aspects can at least help to explain why unmarried women re-
mained in these churches (or even switched to them). Orthodox Protestant 
women and Orthodox Protestant and Jewish men stood out with relatively high 
chances of late marriage. 
Women who, at age 18, lived in an elite household (almost always as daugh-
ters) had a higher risk (47%) to remain unmarried than women from the lower 
middle class, whereas daughters of farmers and unskilled workers had signifi-
cantly lower risks (Table 2). In the latter group, we see a clear pattern of low 
chances to remain single or marry late, and high chances of marrying early. 
This has also been found in a recent analysis of the emergence of the early 
family formation pattern (Bras et al 2010, 1027). This pattern of more frequent 
and less late marriage emerged in the late 19th century, which is also reflected 
in the cohort effects. Especially the women of birth cohort 1890-1909 had a 
much lower likelihood to marry late (after age 28) than the women of 1850-
1869. For both men and women, the decline of permanent celibacy over the 
birth cohorts is much more apparent than in Table 1. Contrary to what is as-
sumed in the literature, women living in cities do not differ strongly in their 
marriage behaviour from women living in small municipalities. The urban 
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employment opportunities associated with cities do not decrease their appetite 
for marriage strongly, at least not when we control for social background. In-
terestingly, urban men do stand out with a lower likelihood of remaining celi-
bate, a lower likelihood of late marriage and a higher likelihood of early mar-
riage (Table 3). Thus, for men factors such as marriage market, employment 
and housing had more effect on incidence and timing of marriage than for 
women. Among men, we find the same basic patterns of social class effects as 
among women, with some differences. E.g. sons of farmers were much more 
likely to delay their marriages than sons from the lower middle class (Table 2). 
Does the family configuration, even if we only have a snapshot of the situa-
tion at age 18, help us to understand life course outcomes of marriage and 
celibacy? We find that, for women, compared to living with both parents, all 
other situations were associated with lower odds of celibacy, lower odds of 
marrying late and higher odds of marrying early. Especially girls who had 
already left home, those who lived with their mother only, and those who lived 
with a stepparent were unlikely to become celibate, probably because they were 
less inclined than other girls to (return or) stay at home. Girls who lived with a 
mother only or living in the household of kin also had significantly higher odds 
to marry early. Is this because of the economic hardship in households run by a 
mother, making early marriage an attractive way out? We also see that the 
more younger children (in particular boys) were living in the household, the 
less likely celibacy and late marriage for women became. Or, in other words, 
youngest and only girls had higher risks of staying at home. An early marriage 
was especially likely when a girl had many young sisters. For boys (Table 3), 
the impact of the family on life course outcomes is more or less similar. An 
interesting difference is that boys whose mother had died were more likely to 
remain celibate. Also noteworthy is that whereas girls who had many younger 
sisters tended to marry early, for this was related to having many younger 
brothers. In other words, when gender-specific tasks could be taken over by 
younger siblings, older children were more likely to marry (very) early. This 
shows that the specific configuration of parents and siblings worked to hasten 
or delay the process of marriage, putting adherence to (group) scripts in per-
spective. 
Having migrated before age 18 did not affect the risks of celibacy. Interest-
ingly, girls who had migrated from (another) city had higher risks of marrying 
early. 
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Table 1: Marriage in the Life Course of Women. Odds Ratios of the Multinomial 
Logistic Regression on Permanent Celibacy, and on Late and Early 
Marriage in Reference to Marriage at a Normal Age. Situation at Age 
18 (Unmarried Women) 
 Permanent Celibacy Late Marriage Early Marriage 
Religion of head of household (Ref.= Liberal Protestant) 
Catholic     1.576****     1.442****   0.820** 
Remonstrant or Men-
nonite 1.602** 0.743  0.507* 
Orthodox Protestant 1.128 1.179* 0.881 
Jewish 1.349 1.348 1.164 
Nondenominational 1.111 0.825 0.797 
Other and unknown 1.289 1.354* 1.080 
Social group of head (Ref.=lower middle class) 
Elite  1.473* 0.953 0.625 
Skilled workers 0.956 1.033 1.394** 
Farmers   0.723** 0.965 0.989 
Unskilled workers     0.555****     0.685****     1.758**** 
Unknown 1.011 0.919 1.216 
Size of municipality (Ref.=population size<5000) 
Size 5000-20.000  0.835* 0.919 0.976 
Size 20.000-100.000 0.911 0.869 1.097 
Size more than 100.000 0.963 0.882 1.120 
Birth cohort (1850-1869=ref.) 
1870-1889   0.807** 0.951 1.096 
1890-1909     0.694****     0.704**** 1.112 
1910-1922     0.573**** 0.920 1.119 
Type of kin co-residence (Ref.=with both parents) 
Left home already     0.509****     0.782*** 1.047 
With father only 0.911 0.854 1.290 
With mother only   0.748** 0.942   1.426** 
With a stepparent    0.619***   0.762** 1.054 
With other kin 0.812 1.003  1.554* 
Children in the household 
Number of girls younger 
than 16 0.954 0.987   1.099** 
Number of boys younger 
than 16 0.931*   0.938** 0.947 
Migration (Ref.=not a migrant) 
Rural migrant 0.987 1.055 0.897 
Urban migrant 1.191 1.125    1.500*** 
Nagelkerke’s r2 0.05   
Number of cases           7808   
Model chi-square  389.44****   
Level of significance: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01; **** 0.001. Notes: Population at risk is all persons 
who survived at least to the age of 50 years old. Women already married at age 18 have been 
removed. Permanent celibacy is defined as still being single at time of death and having 
survived at least until age 50. Late marriage is defined as marrying between age 28 and death. 
Early marriage is defined as marrying younger than 21. Normal age at marriage is defined as 
marrying between age 21 and age 27. 
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Table 2: Marriage in the Life Course of Men. Odds Ratios of the Multinomial 
Logistic Regression on Permanent Celibacy, on Late and Early Marriage 
in Reference to Marriage at a Normal Age. Situation at Age 18 
(Unmarried Men) 
 Permanent Celibacy Late Marriage Early Marriage 
Religion of head of household (Ref.= Liberal Protestant) 
Catholic   1.214**     1.634****    0.762*** 
Remonstrant or Men-
nonite 0.611 0.811  0.506* 
Orthodox Protestant 0.850  1.171* 1.020 
Jewish 0.762   1.784** 1.187 
Nondenominational 1.111 1.294 0.902 
Other and unknown 1.016   1.420** 0.828 
Social group of head (Ref.=lower middle class) 
Elite   1.949** 1.261   0.278** 
Skilled workers 0.773 0.899 0.961 
Farmers 1.257     1.433*** 0.735* 
Unskilled workers 0.848     0.722**** 1.260* 
Unknown 1.013 0.886 0.840 
Size of municipality (Ref.=population size <5000) 
Size 5000-20.000  0.822* 0.921 1.130 
Size 20.000-100.000 0.850 0.872   1.322** 
Size more than 100.000     0.597****    0.792***    1.405*** 
Birth cohort (1850-1869=ref.) 
1870-1889    0.671*** 0.932 1.112 
1890-1909     0.473****    0.751*** 0.931 
1910-1922     0.454**** 0.819* 0.815 
Type of kin co-residence (Ref.=with both parents) 
Left home already  0.748* 0.855 1.116 
With father only 1.350* 1.206 0.999 
With mother only 1.161 1.016 1.132 
With a stepparent    0.585***   0.775** 1.033 
With other kin 1.387 1.084    1.966*** 
Children in the household 
Number of girls younger 
than 16 0.980 0.978 0.957 
Number of boys younger 
than 16 0.947  0.956*  1.066* 
Migration (Ref.=not a migrant) 
Rural migrant 0.997 1.112 1.023 
Urban migrant 0.970 0.853 1.086 
    
Nagelkerke’s r2 0.06   
Number of cases 7889   
Model chi-square 449.39****   
Level of significance: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01; **** 0.001. Notes: Population at risk is all persons 
who survived at least to the age of 50 years old. Men already married at age 18 have been 
removed. Permanent celibacy is defined as still being single at time of death and having 
survived at least until age 50. Late marriage is defined as marrying between age 30 and death. 
Early marriage is defined as marrying younger than 23. Normal age at marriage is defined as 
marrying between age 23 and age 29. 
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What have we learned from this exercise with respect to life scripts? The mod-
els allow us not so much to see emerging new scripts but, by inspecting the 
transgressions of the traditional age norms, to see in what groups ‘instrumental’ 
marriage motives and/or a strong parental hold on one’s life could still override 
those norms. A clear norm existed on the age at which one should be married. 
Yet, very late marriage was still possible among Catholic women and men, 
Orthodox protestant men, men and women with other or unknown denomina-
tions, and farmer’s sons. Very late marriage in this period was unlikely among 
sons and daughters of unskilled workers and men living in cities. Marriage 
delay was also uncommon among oldest children and those who left home 
early or lived with a stepparent. This confirms that parental presence put a 
brake on marriage, especially for younger children. Do we find similar trans-
gressions when it comes to the ‘right’ partner? Did, for instance, people from 
groups with an ‘instrumental’ marriage delay also tend to marry a partner who 
was ‘too young’ or ‘too old’? 
6.  Age Differences between Spouses 
To find the connection between scripts on marriage (age) and norms on partner 
choice, we do a similar exercise. We have defined a ‘normal’ age difference as 
three years or less, and distinguish between older husband marriages and older 
wives marriages, the latter being more rare as well as more culturally deviant. 
We look at first marriages, but the partner can marry for the second time. In 
this model, it is important to control for age at marriage, as the likelihood to 
find a spouse in a given age range is strongly defined by the age at marriage. 
Thus, people who already marry very young are unlikely to have even younger 
partners. Table 3 shows that, indeed, the age at marriage explains a lot of the 
variation in same-age marriage. But even controlling for age at marriage, there 
is a period effect of stronger age homogamy over time visible, in particular 
among the men. It is interesting to see that in the older age ranges not only 
(naturally) the likelihood of marrying a younger partner increases, but also the 
likelihood of marrying an older partner (after age 40 for women, and 35 for 
men). Apparently, relatively narrow age ranges for ‘ideal’ partners lose their 
meaning once people are beyond a given threshold themselves.  
In what groups are ‘transgressions’ of norms governing partner choice more 
or less likely – controlling for age at marriage? For women, marrying an older 
husband occurred more often among rural migrants, and marrying a younger 
husband among daughters of unskilled workers. Women from working class 
families (both skilled and unskilled) and women living in large cities were less 
likely to marry an older husband. Also, rural migrant women were less likely to 
marry a younger husband. These findings are not easy to interpret. Perhaps the 
lower likelihood of urban, working class women to marry older men can be 
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explained by the tendency of these men to marry young themselves (Table 2). 
In that sense, we do not see a breakthrough of a ‘romantic’ norm of equal part-
ner choice in this group. In fact, as we just noticed, daughters of unskilled 
workers still tended to marry younger husbands. This might be explained by 
simple ‘instrumental’ household economics: women from this class often 
worked as servants and it took them some time to amass savings to be pooled 
with the income of a (worker) husband, who might have an income peak in 
relatively young age. 
For men, the supposedly most ‘instrumental’ choice of marrying an older 
wife is associated with already having left home at age 18. Their early leaving 
may have been related to a family crisis. The odds for men living alone with a 
father or mother are also rather high (but not statistically significant). Contrary 
to what we expected on the basis of the women’s model, it is less likely among 
unskilled workers. Marrying a younger wife is (significantly) more likely 
among men living with a mother or with other kin and men without a religion.  
All in all, we see that whereas religion played a strong role in determining 
timing and incidence of marriage, there is no indication that it also directly 
affected the choice for a partner of a given age. Thus, a strong connection be-
tween, e.g. Protestantism or secularism and ‘romantic’ same-age marriage is 
not likely. (Large) cities seem to be the locus of change, as older husband mar-
riages are less frequent in places of more than 100,000 inhabitants. The lower 
classes do show the expected shift towards same-age marriages, but the results 
are ambiguous. In the decline of younger husband marriages women from the 
lower middle class seem to have paved the way. 
Table 3: Odds Ratios of the Multinomial Logistic Regression on Marrying a 
Younger or Older Partner 
 
 
Women Men 
Older Husband Younger Husband Younger Wife Older Wife 
Age at marriage (Ref.=20-24) 
25-29      0.520****    15.651**** 4.563**** 0.952 
30-34 0.890    64.292**** 13.508**** 0.995 
35-39 1.140    85.879**** 23.198****    2.478*** 
40-44    2.335***    86.577**** 21.336**** 1.563 
45-49    3.117***    37.655**** 35.792****    6.559*** 
50+   3.417**   112.741**** 47.781****   5.240** 
Religion of head of household (Ref.= Liberal Protestant) 
Catholic 1.096 1.044 0.956 0.964 
Remonstrant or 
Mennonite 1.108 0.677 0.862 0.955 
Orthodox 
Protestant 0.938 1.153 0.925 1.193 
Jewish 1.161 1.004 0.898 1.389 
Nondenomina-
tional 0.842 0.231  1.561* 1.368 
Other/unknown 0.973 0.889 0.709* 0.854 
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Table 3 continued... 
Social group of head (Ref.=lower middle class) 
Elite 1.021 1.604 1.382 1.669 
Skilled workers    0.695*** 1.491 1.051 0.793 
Farmers 1.022 1.133 1.007  0.653* 
Unskilled workers    0.729***    1.780*** 1.104    0.618*** 
Unknown 0.964 1.302 1.107 0.663* 
Size of municipality (Ref.=population size<5000) 
Size 5000-
20,000  0.866* 0.925 1.047 0.863 
Size 20.000-
100,000 0.946 1.254 0.840 0.916 
Size more than 
100,000   0.822** 0.999   0.810** 1.034 
Birth cohort (Ref.=1850-1869) 
1870-1889 0.883   0.650**   0.795** 0.890 
1890-1909 0.875     0.532****    0.752***    0.564*** 
1910-1922 1.056 0.615   0.751**   0.533** 
Type of kin co-residence (Ref.=with both parents) 
Left home already 1.016 1.211 1.071 1.551** 
With father only 1.059 1.133 1.155 1.420 
With mother only 1.117 0.654   1.313** 1.302 
With a stepparent 0.934 1.279 1.029 1.001 
With other kin 1.078 1.590  1.469* 0.723 
Children in the household 
Number of girls 
younger than 16 1.017 1.035 1.027 0.903* 
Number of boys 
younger than 16 0.954 0.984 0.976 0.998 
Migration (Ref.=not a migrant.) 
Rural migrant     1.168**    0.638*** 0.880 1.086 
Urban migrant    0.784* 0.812 0.863 1.356 
Nagelkerke’s r2 0.16  0.24  
Number of cases 4992  5345  
Model chi-square  706.74****  1148.02****  
Level of significance: * 0.1;** 0.05; *** 0.01;**** 0.001. Notes: Population at risk are all persons 
who married, who survived at least to the age of 50 years old, and whose partner had a known 
age. People married before age 20 have been removed. 
7.  Discussion 
In this article, I aimed to deduce life scripts from micro-level life course varia-
tion and to contrast the outcomes to supposed (subgroup) shifts towards ‘less 
instrumental’ marriages during modernization. It is assumed that in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century some social and cultural groups (city dwell-
ers, middle classes, wage workers, Protestants) began to give a different mean-
ing to marriage and thus to form different norms surrounding it. ‘Instrumental’ 
motives embedding marriage choices of children in the family economy began 
to lose their importance, whereas bourgeois ideals of the home and motherhood 
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became more popular, also among lower classes. Supposedly, there was an in-
creased ‘appetite’ for romantic, egalitarian marriage. It is expected that in groups 
in which these norms spread marriage became more frequent (thus permanent 
celibacy declined), and converged to an ‘ideal’ age (thus delayed marriage was 
less frequent). Also, one can expect a trend toward more same-age marriages. 
Very early marriages were still frowned upon, but they may indicate strong ‘de-
sirability’ of marriage in groups with low thresholds of ‘feasibility’. 
In studying life courses of 15697 persons born between 1850 and 1922, who 
all reached age fifty, I tried to find out whether deviation from assumed general 
norms point at subgroup norms or at individual of family reasons for prema-
ture, delayed or foregone marriage. Of course, there are many caveats to be 
mentioned. First of all, despite the (relative) wealth of information in the His-
torical Sample of the Netherlands, many factors that impact on courtship and 
partner choice are lacking (e.g. education, income, health). Second, I have only 
looked at the situation at age 18 to ‘predict’ future outcomes. Ideally, the im-
pact of one’s situation (family composition, place of residence, occupation) on 
marital choices is assessed at each age in a truly dynamic model. This is feasi-
ble, but highly complex. Third, the contextual information should ideally be 
extended with employment opportunities (in particular for women) and with 
information on the marriage market. Ideally, we would like to have information 
on the availability of partners at the subgroup level. Then we could answer 
questions such as: are preferences for an ideal marriage age or an ideally aged 
marriage partner affected by being a religious minority in a given region? Fi-
nally, the qualitative information on age norms is still sketchy, and mainly 
stemming from ethnographic material on rural customs. We know little on how 
age norms and sanctions functioned in an urban context.  
Still, the outcomes suggest that indeed some groups ‘lagged behind’ in 
terms of a higher incidence of ‘instrumental’ late marriage and celibacy – but 
not in terms of a larger age difference between spouses. The latter is mainly 
explained by the timing of marriage as such. Other groups did show a tendency 
toward the ‘modern’ marriage norms (men living in cities, workers’ children). 
But family factors remained important, as well as the individual experience of 
migrating and having to adjust to new surroundings. 
In her discussion of age norms, Marini (1984) stated that the functioning of 
such norms can only be proven by juxtaposing detailed information on (sub-
group) norms to determinants of life course variation. This paper has set a few 
steps in that direction and has shown the feasibility of that approach. However, 
much more information both on life courses within local contexts, as on the 
norms and sanctions of groups are needed. 
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